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Jurisdictional Statement 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4- ~ 
103(2)(e). 
The district court issued its Sentence, Judgment, Commitment in State v. 
Courtney, District Court Case No. 121901670, on December 30, 2013 (R. 183-84; 
attached at Addendum A). On December 1, 2014, the district court reinstated 
Appellant Carl Courtney's time to file an appeal (R. 259), and Mr. Courtney timely 
filed a notice of appeal on December 26, 2014 (R. 268). 
Statement of the Issues 
Issue: Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to timely move for a 
mistrial. 
Standard of Review: "A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for 
the first time on appeal presents a question of law that the court reviews for ~ 
correctness." State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ,r 11,328 P.3d 841 (quotation omitted). 
Preservation: This issue is not preserved. But "claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, when raised for the first time on appeal, are excepted from 
the preservation rule." State v. Gailey, 2015 UT App 249, ,r 7, _ P.3d _. 
Determinative Provisions 
Addendum B sets forth U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV and Utah Const. art. I, 
§ 12. 
1 
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1. 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
The State charged Mr. Courtney with Distribution of or Arranging to 
Distribute a Controlled Substance, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code§ 58-37-B(l)(a)(ii). (R. 6, 302:5.) The case went to a jury trial. Duringvoir dire, 
a potential juror informed the jury panel that she had 11affiliations" with Mr. 
Courtney "especially during the time that [she] was serving as an agent for the 
Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force." (R. 302:23.) The court dismissed the juror, 
and voir dire and the trial continued. The jury convicted Mr. Courtney, and the 
district court sentenced him to an indetermmate term of one to fifteen years' 
vJ imprisonment. (R. 183.) Mr. Courtney appeals. 
2. Statement of Facts 
Mr. Courtney's jury trial in Weber County began with the district court 
informing the jury panel that Mr. Courtney had been charged with distributing a 
controlled substance. (R. 302:5.) After a series of preliminary questions, Mr. 
Courtney's attorney introduced Mr. Courtney to the jury panel and asked if 
anyone knew him. (Add. C; R. 302:23.)1 A potential juror responded: "Due to my 
1 An excerpt of the relevant portions of voir dire is attached as Addendum C. 
The names of the jurors are included in the transcript, and those names and (and 
the name of the husband of the juror who made the tainting remark) have been 
redacted. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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years in law enforcement, yes. I have had affiliations with him, especially during 
the time that I was serving as an agent for the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike <w, 
Force." (Add. C; R. 302:23.) While the potential juror made her comment, other 
jurors "piped up" and listened to what she was saying. (Add. C; R. 302:58.) Neither 
the district court nor the attorneys commented on the potential juror's statement. 
(Add. C; R. 302:23-24.) 
Voir dire continued until the district court asked whether anyone would 
have difficulty considering Mr. Courtney innocent until proven guilty or whether 
anyone would believe that because Mr. Courtney had merely been charged that a 
basis must exist for his guilt. (Add. C; R. 302:39.) The same potential juror raised 
her hand. (Add. C; R. 302:39, 60.) She was the "only person that raised her hand to 
that question" and it "drew attention to her again." (Add. C; R. 302:60.) Before the 
it 
Wii' 
potential juror responded orally, the district court asked the attorneys for a ~ 
sidebar. (Add. C; R. 302:39.) 
During the sidebar, the district court expressed that it did not want the juror 
to II taint[] the pool and if we have an issue now where you already feel that she 
has done that, then we need to make a record on it because I don't want to plow 
through, pick a jury of eight and then have this become an issue." (Add. C; R. 
302:39-40.) The State suggested excusing the juror immediately. (Add. C; R. 
302:40.) Mr. Courtney's counsel stated that he did not know the best way to handle 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the situation. (Add. C; R. 302:40-42.) The court asked the attorneys what they 
v) wanted it to do and if they felt that the juror had tainted the pool by raising a prior 
bad acts issue "in a very roundabout way without being specific." (Add. C; R. 
302:42.) The court and the attorneys considered whether the court should ask a 
curative question, but then they settled on excusing the juror immediately under 
the pretense that her husband worked as a probation officer in the court. (Add. C; 
R. 302:43.) The court then asked the juror whether her husband was a probation 
officer, and after the juror confirmed her husband's occupation, the court excused 
her. (Add. C; R. 302:43-44.) 
Voir dire continued. Mr. Courtney's counsel passed the jury for cause. ( Add. 
C; R. 302:49.) Then the attorneys exercised their preemptory strikes and picked the 
jury, and the jury was sworn. (Add. C; R. 302:55-56.) 
After the jury was sworn, the court called for a recess and asked the 
attorneys if they had anything to discuss. (Add. C; R. 302:57.) Mr. Courtney's 
attorney and the court made a record as to what happened with the potential juror. 
(Add. C; R. 302:58-60.) The court told Mr. Courtney's attorney that he had never 
made a formal motion for a mistrial before the jury was sworn, and the court was 
concerned that since the jury had been sworn that jeopardy attached. (Add. C; R. 
302:61-62.) In explaining why he did not move for mistrial, Mr. Courtney's 
attorney explained, 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I haven't had a chance to talk to my client about his 
concerns about it either. I mean we just kept rolling so I 
thought-and I missed the Court swearing the Jury. I 
was re-organizing and shifting sides and wasn't paying 
attention when you were swearing the Jury in. So I 
actually want for the jeopardy to attach, but I wasn't 
paying attention as I was going on. I was trying to re-
arrange and my client was asking me a question and so I 
didn't catch the issue, but I had every intention of 
bringing it to the record because he leaned over and 
made some comments to me. I didn't want to draw more 
attention from the Jury panel as we were selecting them 
about what was taking place, but he does have a concern 
about the jury pool being tainted based on [the juror's] 
comments. 
(Add. C; R. 302:62-63.) The court responded: 
The minute the response was made we could have 
excused the panel and you could have made that motion 
right at that moment or we could have had discussion 
about ferreting out the poisoning effect, if any, that the 
rest of the jurors experienced from the response. That 
was not done and even as late as right before the jury was 
selected there was no motion made and so I'm just going 
to find that at this point the motion is untimely. 
(Add. C; R. 302:64.) The court expressed its frustration about the situation and its 
concern that Mr. Courtney's counsel was ineffective for failing to bring the motion 
for mistrial before the jury was sworn. (Add. C; R. 302:65-67.) After more 
discussion, the court asked Mr. Courtney's counsel if he wanted to make a formal 
motion; counsel moved for a mistrial, which the court denied as untimely. (Add. 
C; R. 302:70-72.) 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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At trial, the State's main witness was a Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike 
VP Force agent. (R. 302:95.) The agent testified that a confidential informant set up a 
drug purchase with Darrell Dickerson. (R. 302:103.) The confidential informant 
called Mr. Dickerson before the purchase to let him know he was coming. (R. 
302:107.) The agent- who was undercover- went with the confidential informant 
to a hotel room registered to Mr. Dickerson. (R. 302:103, 105-107, 128.) 
When the agent and the informant entered the hotel room, they observed 
four people; Mr. Dickerson was laying on a bed, Mr. Courtney was sitting at a 
table near the bed, and two other people were elsewhere in the room. (R. 302:109-
110.) The confidential informant approached the table, and after making some 
comments, asked, "[I]s that me right there?" -referring to whether a package of 
drugs was his. (R. 302:121-22.) Mr. Courtney responded, "I don't know." (R. 
302:138.) Then the agent testified that Mr. Courtney handed a baggie with 
methamphetamine to the informant, who then handed it to the agent. (R. 302:115.) 
But on cross-examination the agent admitted that he did not see Mr. Courtney 
hand the drugs to the informant. (R. 302:139, 170.) The agent also admitted that 
he never saw the drugs in Mr. Courtney's possession. (R. 302:133.) 
During the jury deliberations, the jury sent a question to the court. (R. 
302:216-17.) The jury asked the court to define the instruction setting forth the 
elements of the distribution crime. (R. 70; 302:216.) Specifically, the jury asked for 
6 
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further definition of the terms "[a]greed, consented, offered, or arranged to 
distribute methamphetamine." (R. 70; 302:216.) The court instructed the jury to ~ 
use its common sense in defining those terms. (R. 44.) The jury then found Mr. 
Courtney guilty of distributing or arranging to distribute a controlled substance. 
(R. 302:220.) 
Summary of the Argument 
Mr. Courtney's counsel was ineffective when he failed to timely move for a 
mistrial based on the potential juror's tainting remarks. Mr. Courtney was 
prejudiced by his counsel's actions; the district court would have granted the 
motion. Moreover, Mr. Courtney was harmed because the evidence against him 
was not strong or overwhelming, so a comment by the potential juror that she had 
interactions with Mr. Courtney in her past drug interdiction work could have 
pushed the jury towards conviction and ultimately undermines confidence in the ~ 
jury's verdict. 
Argument 
1. Mr. Courtney's counsel was ineffective for failing to timely move for a 
mistrial. 
For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must satisfy the 
Strickland2 standard, which requires a defendant to prove "(1) that counsel's 
2 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984). 
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performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different." 
State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ,r 18,321 P.3d 1136 (quotation omitted). "Proving that 
his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
requires [the defendant] to rebut the strong presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." 
State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ,r 34,247 P.3d 344 (quotations omitted). Sound trial strategy 
does not require trial counsel to submit a motion or lodge an objection that would 
be futile. State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, ,r 33, 248 P.3d 984. 
Here, Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely move 
for a mistrial based on the potential juror's prejudicial comments that tainted the 
jury panel during voir dire. 
1.1 Mr. Courtney's counsel performed deficiently. 
"Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution guarantee 
an accused the right to a fair and impartial jury." State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ,r 36, 
24 P.3d 948; see U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Utah Const. art. I, § 12. "Among the 
most essential responsibilities of defense counsel is to protect his client's 
constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury by using voir dire to identify and 
ferret out jurors who are biased against the defense." Miller v. Francis, 269 F.3d 609, 
8 
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615 (6th Cir. 2001). When an attorney believes a potential juror is unable to be 
impartial, an attorney may request that the juror be removed from the panel. See ~ 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(13)-(14) (rules for challenges for cause); State v. Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, ,r 25, 12 P.3d 92 (noting that a potential juror should be removed if 
juror expressed strong or unequivocal bias). 
"Ordinarily, if a party knows or believes that a juror or jury is disqualified 
because of bias or prejudice, the challenge must be asserted before the jury is 
sworn; otherwise it is waived." Burton v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 249 P.2d 514, 
516 (Utah 1952).3 The timing of the objection is especially important in criminal 
proceedings, where jeopardy attaches once the jury is sworn and empaneled. State 
3 The necessity of objecting to a juror before the jury is sworn is firmly 
established in case law. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2) (" A challenge to an individual 
juror may be made only before the jury is sworn [but a court may permit a 
challenge after the jury is sworn upon a showing of good cause]."); State v. DeMille, 
756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988) (holding that a defendant's failure to ask jurors during 
voir dire about a foreseeable issue of bias or object to the court's failure to do so 
constituted a waiver of the bias question); State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 
1983) (per curiam) (holding that a defendant who neither objected to allegedly 
improper voir dire nor sought permission to inquire further into prospective 
jurors' biases waived his claim of juror bias); Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), overruled on other grounds by State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, 27 
P.3d 1115 (" A specific objection to the failure to make a requested voir dire inquiry 
is required so that the trial court may correct its error before the jury is selected 
and empaneled."); see also United States v. Street, 614 F.3d 228, 234-35 (6th Cir. 
2010); Vonberg v. Turley, No. 2:09-CV-1027 DB, 2011 WL 573409, at*2 (D. Utah Feb. 
15, 2011) ("[U]nder the doctrine of 'invited error,' Utah appellate courts will not 
address the merits of challenges to jury taint when those challenges were not made 
during voir dire."). 
9 
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v. Manatau, 2014 UT 7, 19,322 P.3d 739. Requiring a timely objection "prevents 
~ defendants from sandbagging the prosecution by waiting until the only available 
remedy for the alleged error is outright dismissal or a new trial." State v. Johnson, 
2013 UT App 276, 18,316 P.3d 994 (quotations omitted). Furthermore, "[p]assing 
the jury for cause ... obviate[ s] the possibility of the trial judge questioning the 
jury more carefully as to [the] matter [at issue] and permit[s] [the court] to excuse 
'1V 
the rest of the jury panel so that the trial [can] not ... continue[]." Burton, 249 P.2d 
at 516; see Butterfield v. Sevier Valley Hosp., 2010 UT App 357, 1 28, 246 P.3d 120 
(holding that because plaintiffs passed on the jury for cause, plaintiffs invited the 
court's error). 
Here, Mr. Courtney's trial counsel had multiple opportunities to move for a 
mistrial before the jury was sworn but failed to do so. He could have moved for a 
mistrial right after the potential juror made her initial comment that she knew Mr. 
Courtney from her time on the narcotics strike force. (Add. C; R. 302:23.) 
He could have moved for a mistrial during the lengthy sidebar with the trial 
court after the potential juror indicated she could not afford Mr. Courtney his 
presumption of innocence. (Add. C; R. 302:39-43.) At the beginning of that sidebar, 
the district court stated that it did not want the potential juror "tainting the pool" 
and invited the attorneys to act if they believed that potential juror had already 
tainted the panel. (Add. C; R. 302:39-40.) In fact, the district court asked Mr. 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Courtney's counsel what to do, and trial counsel said, "I don't know how the 
handle this. I don't know how to handle this." (Add. C; R. 302:40.) After the district 
court suggested that it dismiss the potential juror because of her husband's 
connection to the court, trial counsel said, "I don't know that that's the best way 
to handle it." (Add. C; R. 302:41-42.) The district court asked trial counsel for 
suggestions, and trial counsel said, "That's the best approach as possible at this 
point, what you're suggesting." (Add. C; R. 302:42.) Trial counsel then suggested 
that the jury was tainted, and the district court stated that it did not "profess to 
have all the answers." (Add. C; R. 302:43.) Trial counsel responded, "I have less 
answers than you." (R. 302:43.) Throughout the sidebar, the district court solicited 
trial counsel's advice on how to move forward, and trial counsel failed to bring a ~ 
motion for mistrial. 
Trial counsel again could have asked for a mistrial during the sidebar where 
the attorneys struck jurors for cause. (R. 302:46-48.) Instead, trial counsel passed 
on the jury for cause. (Add. C; R. 302:49.) 
Finally, trial counsel could have moved for a mistrial during or after he 
exercised his preemptory strikes. (Add. C; R. 302:54-55.) Instead, trial counsel 
exercised his strikes and expressly consented to the selection of the jury. (Add. C; 
R. 302:55.) And after the district court thanked those who were not selected for the 
11 
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jury and had the jury seated, the court had the jury sworn-without any motion 
I.ii) for a mistrial from trial counsel. (Add. C; R. 302:55-56.) 
VJ) 
~ 
After the jury was sworn, trial counsel asked the district court to make a 
record on the jury tainting issue, and trial counsel admitted that he never moved 
for a mistrial. (Add. C; R. 302:62.) He stated that he "missed the Court swearing 
the Jury" because he was "re-organizing and shifting sides and wasn't paying 
attention." (Add. C; R. 302:63.) He also stated that he "didn't want to draw more 
attention from the Jury panel as we were selecting them about what was taking 
place." (Id.) He later told the trial court that he "didn't know where [he] was 
supposed to make the timely-[he] thought it was after the jury was picked." 
(Add. C; R. 302:66.) 
When trial counsel finally brought the motion for mistrial, the district court 
found that "numerous opportunities ... existed to bring this motion previously," 
so it deemed the motion untimely and denied it. (Add. C; R. 302:72.) 
It is true that" counsel's actions during voir dire are presumed to be matters 
of trial strategy." Fox v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1286, 1295 (10th Cir. 2000); see Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, ,r 20 (noting presumptions offered to trial counsel during voir dire 
because of the Strickland standard). But trial counsel's stated reasons on the record 
for not timely moving for a mistrial do not indicate a reasonable trial strategy. 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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First, trial counsel stated that he did not move for a mistrial prior to the jury 
being sworn because he did not want to draw the jury's attention to the tainting 
remarks of the potential juror. (Add. C; R. 302:63.) But trial counsel had several 
opportunities to move for a mistrial without giving undue attention to the ~ 
potential juror's comments. For example, trial counsel could have moved for a 
mistrial during the sidebar where the attorneys struck jurors for cause. (Add. C; R. 
302:46-48.) Trial counsel could have also moved for a mistrial while the attorneys 
exercised their preemptory strikes. (Add. C; R. 302:54-55.) In both instances, the 
potential juror had been dismissed from the panel for some time. Because trial 
counsel had several opportunities to move for a mistrial without drawing 
attention to the tainting comment, his failure to do so is not reasonable trial 
strategy. 
Second, trial counsel indicated that he did not know he was supposed to ~ 
make the motion for a mistrial before the jury was "picked." (Add. C; R. 302:66.) 
But this reason is contradicted by his other comment that he missed the district 
court swearing the jury because he was not paying attention-he implies that he 
knew that he was supposed to make a motion before the jury was sworn but 
missed the swearing in because he was distracted. (Add. C; R. 302:63.) At the very 
least, trial counsel was not paying attention, and failure to pay attention is not 
reasonable trial strategy. See Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, 1 75, 156 P.3d 739 (noting 
13 
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that a defendant can rebut the presumption of reasonable trial strategy by showing 
1
,;J) that trial counsel was inattentive or indifferent). But even more worrisome, trial 
counsel misunderstood well-established law, which requires that objections to a 
juror be lodged before the jury is sworn. See, e.g., Burton, 249 P.2d at 516. Counsel's 
misunderstanding of the law is not a reasonable trial strategy. See State v. Hallett, 
856 P.2d 1060, 1063 (Utah 1993) (noting that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to erroneous construction of statute). 
Furthermore, courts have consistently held that an attorney's failure to act 
in a timely manner renders the attorney's performance deficient. See State v. Crosby, 
927 P.2d 638, 645-46 (Utah 1996) (holding that counsel was ineffective for not 
timely objecting to the information); State v. Ferry, 2007 UT App 128, ,r 16, 163 P.3d 
647 ("Defendant's trial counsel therefore rendered ineffective assistance by failing 
to timely file Defendant's motion to suppress evidence."); State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 
351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (" [W]e fail to see how trial counsel's failure to meet 
a crucial filing deadline can be explained as a sound trial tactic or strategy.") 
Similarly, no reasonable trial strategy explains trial counsel's failure to 
timely move for a mistrial. Consequently, Mr. Courtney's counsel performed 
deficiently. 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1.2 Mr. Courtney was prejudiced by his counsel's performa11-ce. 
Trial counsel's failure to timely move for a mistrial prejudiced Mr. ~ 
Courtney. "To show prejudice in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, the 
defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's errors actually had an 
adverse effect on the defense and that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." State 
v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ,r 40, 247 P.3d 344 (quotations omitted). "A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. 
( quotations omitted). 
Here, Mr. Courtney was prejudiced because, if trial counsel had timely 
moved for a mistrial, the district court would have likely granted it. A district court 
may grant a mistrial when "circumstances are such as to reasonably indicate that 
a fair trial cannot be had and that a mistrial is necessary in order to avoid injustice." ~ 
State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ,r 45, 24 P.3d 948 (quotation omitted). In instances where 
a potential juror insinuates to the jury panel during voir dire that the defendant 
committed a similar crime in the past, a defendant is prejudiced. See Dippolito v. 
State, 143 So.3d 1080, 1085-86 (Fla. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a comment by a 
potential jlJ!Or was not harmless because of the possibility that jurors were 
prejudiced by the allegation that was close to the charged crime); Tabor v. 
Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 569, 572-73 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997) (reasoning that a 
15 
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1._;) 
potential juror's comment that she might have met the defendant at a correctional 
institution was prejudicial because the panel learned about the defendant's 
inadmissible conviction through voir dire); Richardson v. State, 666 So.2d 223,224 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that defendant was deprived his right to an impartial 
jury when a potential juror, who informed the panel that she was employed by a 
correctional institution, suggested that she knew the defendant through her 
employment, implying that he was a convicted felon). 
Here, the district court realized that the potential juror informed the jury of 
Mr. Courtney's prior bad acts "in a very roundabout way without being specific." 
(Add. C; R. 302:42.) The district court seemed to acknowledge that the potential 
·J juror's comment created a situation where Mr. Courtney was unable to have a fair 
trial when the court expressed its frustration multiple times over the improper 
comment. In one instance, the court stated that the problem "was created by a juror 
who quite honestly, in my opinion, ought to be bitch-slapped because ... I mean 
for her not to understand the tainting that she was creating when she said that, 
its's hard for me to ... I'm just so frustrated .... " (Add. C; R. 302:67-68.) The court 
also said, "That juror should be slapped for- I mean that's an extreme statement, 
but it just reflects the frustration of the Court that she would go beyond the simple 
question of do you know and offer what she offered. It's so frustrating to me." 
~ (Add. C; R. 302:69.) 
16 
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In making these comments, the district court realized that in a case where a 
defendant was charged with drug distribution from his interactions with the 
Weber-Morgan Narcotics Task Force, and a potential juror informed the panel that 
she knew of Mr. Courtney from her employment with the Weber-Morgan 
Narcotics Task Force, the jury panel was given information about Mr. Courtney's 
past bad acts that improperly colored their view of the case. See Dippolito, 143 So.3d 
at 1085-86; Tabor, 948 S.W.2d at 572-73; Richardson, 666 So.2d at 224. In attempting 
to remedy the situation, the district court elicited suggestions from trial counsel, 
but trial counsel gave no substantive answers. (Add. C; R. 302:41-42.) Given the 
district court's recognition that the potential juror's comment was improper and 
the court's attempt to solve the problems caused by the comment, the district court 
likely would have granted a timely motion for mistrial. 
Moreover, the trial would have turned out differently had the jury panel not <t. 
been exposed to the tainting remark. Strong evidence of Mr. Courtney's guilt did 
not exist. See State v. Alvarado, 2014 UT App 87, if28, 325 P.3d 116. In fact, the 
undercover operation was focused on Mr. Dickerson; the confidential informant 
called Mr. Dickerson right be£ ore the drug interaction occurred, and the 
confidential informant purchased the drugs in a hotel room registered to Mr. 
Dickerson. (R. 302:95, 103, 105-107, 128.) When the confidential informant 
approached the table where Mr. Courtney was sitting and asked if the drugs were 
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his, Mr. Courtney responded, "I don't know." (R. 302:121-22; 138.) And the State's 
main witness admitted that he did not see Mr. Courtney hand the drugs to the 
informant and he never saw the drugs in Mr. Courtney's possession. (R. 302:133, 
139, 170.) 
Furthermore, the jury's question during deliberations illustrates the 
closeness of the case. The jury asked the district court to further define the 
elements of the crime, especially the element that the defendant ''[a]greed, 
consented, offered, or arranged to distribute methamphetamine." (R. 70; 302:216.) 
The evidence against Mr. Courtney simply was not conclusive: he was not the 
target of the undercover drug investigation; he was not the one who the informant 
~ called minutes before the drug purchase; he did not know if the drugs on the table 
were the informant's; and he did not, according to the State's main witness, have 
the drugs in his possession. 
The potential juror's tainting comment that she had interacted with Mr. 
Courtney through her work on the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force 
improperly tipped the scale in favor of conviction - the comment informed the 
jury of past bad acts involving drugs and allowed the jury to reason that if Mr. 
Courtney had been involved with drugs once, he was probably involved in this 
instance, also. See, generally, United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432, 444 (6th Cir. 2008) 
'-9 ("The only way to reach the conclusion that the person currently has the intent to 
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possess and distribute based solely on evidence of unrelated prior convictions for 
drug distribution is by employing the very kind of reasoning-i.e., once a drug ~ 
dealer, always a drug dealer-which 404(b) excludes."). Because of the shortage 
of strong evidence and the nature of the potential juror's tainting comment, this 
court should lack confidence in this jury's verdict. 
Mr. Courtney was prejudiced by his counsel's failures. Because his counsel 
was deficient and Mr. Courtney was prejudiced thereby, his counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective. 
Conclusion 
Mr. Courtney's counsel was ineffective. His counsel performed deficiently 
when he failed to timely move for a mistrial, and Mr. Courtney was prejudiced by 
his counsel's failure. Consequently, this Court should vacate the jury's verdict and 
remand Mr. Courtney's case for a new trial. 
DATED this 9th day of October, 2015. 
ADAMS LEGAL LLC 
1310 Madera Hills Drive 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
eadams@adamslegalllc.com 
(801) 309-9625 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Carl Courtney 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Prosecutor: HEWARD, GARY R 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 4TH APP 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 121901670 FS 
Judge: MICHAEL DIREDA 
Date: December 30, 2013 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
SEAN YOUNG 
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 12, 1968 
Audio 
Tape Number: 2Dl23013 Tape Count: 10:49-11:02 
CHARGES 
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANC -
2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 07/15/2013 Guilty 
HEARING 
Defendant present in the custody of Weber County Jail. 
Defense counsel requests a deviation from the prison 
recommendation. 
Defendant addresses the Court. 
Court makes prefacing comments. 
State addresses the prison recommendation and the defendant's 
criminal history. 
The Court makes a record regarding the sentence in this case 
running consecutively as opposed to concurrently with the 
defendant's other sentences. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant 1 s conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE 
DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANC a 2nd Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than 
one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Printed: 12/30/13 13:20:24 Page 1 
/ 
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Case No: 121901670 Date: Dec 30, 2013 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
This sentence to run consecutively to the sentences imposed in case 
no. 131900508, 121900920 and 121901671. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court recommends the defendant be considered for a substance 
abuse treatment such as Con-Quest, Drug Board or some other 
program. 
Date: 
Credit is granted for time served. 
td/~/r:; 
District Court Judge 
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U.S. Const. amend. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
Utah Const. art. I, § 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, 
to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this 
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by 
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statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 
statute or rule. 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
familiar with you. I met you. Courtney, I haven't seen him 
since high school really. So, yeah. Nothing. 
MR. ARNOLD: Thank you. I believe [inaudible] 
WOMAN: I know Jason through mutual friends and Courtney 
Ryan is the step-father to my nieces and nephews. 
MR. ARNOLD: Is there anything about that relationship 
that would cause you to favor one side or the other? 
WOMAN: No. 
MR. ARNOLD: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Young would you like to conduct any 
follow-up on either of these three witnesses at this time? 
MR. YOUNG: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. All right. Mr. Young let me. 
allow you to introduce yourself and any witnesses you intend to 
call. 
MR. YOUNG: My name is Sean Young. I'm a criminal defense 
attorney here in Ogden. This is Carl Courtney. He's the 
defendant in this case and we intend to possibly call Mr. 
Courtney as our only witness in this case. Does anybody know 
myself or Mr. Courtney? 
Due to my years in law enforcement, yes. I 
have had affiliations with him, especially during the time that 
I was serving as an agent for the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike 
Force. 
WOMAN: Mr. Young represented my husband in a case. 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
MR. YOUNG: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right ladies and gentlemen, as I indicated 
to you at the outset this is a criminal trial in which the 
defendant Carl Mack Courtney, Jr. has been charged by 
information which has been duly filed with the commission of 
distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance. To the best of your knowledge and memory has any one 
of you heard or read anything about this case? If so would you 
please raise your hand? All right, I don't see any hands 
raised. 
GENTLEMAN: Sorry. 
THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. 
GENTLEMAN: Previously to today? 
THE COURT: Yes, previous to today. 
GENTLEMAN: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right, the next questions go to your prior 
jury service. If any of you have had the opportunity to serve 
on a jury previously, please raise your hand. All right. What 
I'd like to know, starting with you , is when your 
jury service was, what kind of case it was if you remember and 
what the result of that case was, what the outcome was. 
I believe it was 1982. It was Judge 
Wahlquist's Court. I had one other previous jury duty, but it 
was in Mississippi a couple years prior to that before my moving 
out here. The case here was a civil case. Well, I guess you 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
teenager. So--
THE COURT: Okay. Okay, the next question. Would any of 
you have difficulty in affording the defendant his guarantee of 
being considered innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt or stated differently would any of you believe 
that because the defendant has been charged in this case by the 
State that there must be some basis for his guilt? 
before you respond, perhaps what we ought to 
do--may I see counsel at the bench for just a moment please? 
Will you hold off on your response? Thank you. 
[Discussion at bench.] 
THE COURT: We dodged a bullet the first time. 
MR. YOUNG: No, we didn't. We--
THE COURT: Well I mean I guess what I'm saying is we 
didn't dwell on it. We didn't linger on it. I recognize what 
you're saying, but the problem is there's no way to anticipate 
that she would say what she said. I mean--
MR. ARNOLD: But the question was do you know Carl. I 
knew that she would strike. 
MR. YOUNG: There's no previous strike orders. 
MR. ARNOLD: Well, we don't, but you know she's been at 
Riverdale P.D. for a long time. 
THE COURT: Well I don't think there's any question that 
she is gone. I guess the bigger issue though is I don't want 
her tainting the pool and if we have an issue now where you 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
already feel that she has done that, then we need to make a 
record on it because I don't want to plow through, pick a jury 
of eight and then have this become an issue. I mean I guess I 
don't know how we're going to determine whether she has tainted 
the pool or not. ~ 
MR. ARNOLD: I mean what if we stipulate that she be 
excused? 
THE COURT: Now? 
MR. ARNOLD: Now. 
MR. YOUNG: But that's kind of [inaudible] 
THE COURT: Well you tell me what you--
MR. YOUNG: I don't know how to handle this. I don't know 
how to handle this. We can take her back in chambers. We can 
always take her back in chambers or everyone is going to know 
what's going on. 
THE COURT: Well, okay. Then if I don't take her back in 
chambers, then I just allow her response in open Court. What do 
I do? She stood up now. I've got to do something. 
MR. ARNOLD: I would say that we--I mean given her prior 
you know, I mean relationship with the facts, I mean the Strike 
Force and everything, I think we need to just cut her right here 
and just say thank you. 
MR. YOUNG: [inaudible] 
THE COURT: Well let me try to handle it in a different 
way. I think what I'm going to do is I'm going to ask her if 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
her husband is I know he is. He's a probation 
guy from Alliance--or, no, Utah Alternative and I'm just going 
to indicate this from the fact that her husband works in my 
Court that maybe it would be appropriate to let her go and I 
won't even draw attention to the law enforcement, Weber-Morgan 
Narcotics Strike Force [inaudible] I'll just connect it to the 
probation issue. Kick her loose for that reason and just leave 
it alone. 
MR. YOUNG: You can just tell them that [inaudible] 
because her husband is working for--
THE COURT: No. I think I'm just going to let her go 
because the real--
MR. YOUNG: Have her walk out right now? 
THE COURT: Well if I base it on the probation connection, 
I don't think I create a problem. The problem that I have is if 
I leave her here, what are we going to do every time there's a 
question? She's going to stand up and I'm going to shut her 
down and it just draws more attention to her. 
MR. YOUNG: If she walks out right now. 
THE COURT: Well all it does is draw attention to the fact 
that her husband is a probation officer in my Court and for that 
reason I'm going to just act like--
MR. YOUNG: [inaudible] 
THE COURT: Well, okay, but then what do you--
MR. YOUNG: I don't know that that's the best way to 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
handle it. 
THE COURT: Well, but you've got to do more than tell me 
that you don't like my approach. You've got to offer a 
suggestion. 
MR. YOUNG: That's the best approach as possible at this 
point, what you're suggesting. 
THE COURT: I think I say well you're likely to be 
excused. If I leave her there then every question I ask has the 
potential for her--
MR. ARNOLD: What about some follow-up? Excuse her and 
then follow-up with the jurors based on--
THE COURT: Well, I had no idea she was going to say she 
knew Mr. Courtney. 
MR. ARNOLD: I had no idea. I had no idea. 
THE COURT: I mean I thought she would say she knew you. 
I didn't know she would say she knew [inaudible] 
MR. ARNOLD: That's [inaudible] I agree. That's what I 
would--
THE COURT: And once it was out there was nothing I could 
do. I couldn't unring the bell. Well, you tell me what you 
want to do. If you feel that because of that the jury has been 
tainted, because I mean that sort of goes to the whole 404 
issue. You weren't going to get into 404 unless they opened the 
door. Well she kind of did that in a very roundabout way 
without being specific. 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
801-983-2180 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
MR. ARNOLD: I agree. 
THE COURT: But I mean I'll--
MR. ARNOLD: What if we did this? She's excused based on 
the probation [inaudible} and then some colloquy, some 
questions. You heard this witness or this potential juror talk 
about her relationship with Mr. Courtney. Do any of you 
jurors--has that affected--are you able to maintain--
THE COURT: What do you think about trying to ferret out 
the reason [inaudible} The problem is it's a loaded question. 
If they're smart, they say yes and they know they're gone. 
That's the problem. 
MR. ARNOLD: That's true. [inaudible] 
MR. YOUNG: Well, if they want to be on the jury, they'll 
say no. They're tainted. 
THE COURT: And they say no. I understand. Well I don't 
profess to have all the answers. 
MR. YOUNG: I have less answers than you. 
THE COURT: Well I'm not sure that you do. 
MR. YOUNG: Let's get her out on the probation itself. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
, before you answer, I was discussing with Mr. 
Young and Mr. Arnold, both attorneys who are assigned to my 
Court on Thursdays, if , who is also assigned 
to my Court is your husband. 
Yes, Sir. 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
THE COURT: Okay. I wasn't sure when you said that and I 
was trying to make the connection and then it occurred to me 
he's relatively new in his position with the probation company 
that he works for. Is that right? 
Right. 
THE COURT: I mean not brand new, but new enough that I'm 
just not used to having him all the time. The discussion that 
we had at the bench was based on the fact that your husband 
comes to my Court every Thursday as a probation officer for that 
private probation company, I think it would be better to just 
excuse you at this time. I think that just the fact that I have 
that, that he's working in my Court with other probation 
entities, I think creates enough of an issue that beyond your 
own experiences and things, I think that's probably enough. 
So rather than have you stay here only to excuse you at 
the end, I think what we'll do is just let you get on your way 
now if that's okay with you. 
That's fine with me Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
Thanks. 
THE COURT: Appreciate your time. All right. So let me 
repeat the question and I apologize for the interruption. Would 
any of you have difficulty in affording the defendant his 
guarantee of being considered innocent until proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt or stated another way would any of you 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
BAILIFF: No. That's the only one that's clean. Every 
other one I saw had something up here, defense, bailiff, in 
Court clerk. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Then I'll hand that to you. 
BAILIFF: Okay. 
THE COURT: Mr. Arnold do you pass the jury for cause? 
MR. ARNOLD: I do. 
THE COURT: Mr. Young do you pass the jury for cause? 
MR. YOUNG: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Now ladies and gentlemen each of 
the parties has a chance to disqualify four of you from serving 
on the jury for a total of eight. They can do that for any 
reason and you shouldn't take it personally. I wouldn't imagine 
that you would. You'd probably celebrate actually, but some 
people, believe it or not, get offended. I mean they walk out 
thinking why in the world didn't they select me? I'm the 
perfect juror. If they were to have, you know, in the 
dictionary juror, my picture should be there because I'm the 
person that should be on this jury and all I can tell you is 
that when I was an attorney, before I became a judge, I had my 
own theories of the kinds of people that I wanted on my jury and 
when I won, my theories were validated and when I lost, I went 
back to the drawing board and reconsidered my theories. 
They can excuse you for any reason. They can look at the 
clothing you're wearing, the way you comb your hair, what you do 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
soda doesn't expire, let me just tell you that it does. I went 
back not too long ago and checked the refrigerator and noticed 
that these soda cans have expiration dates on them and I was in 
a meeting back in my jury room and I said I don't think soda 
expires and so it was one of those sort of dare things. They 
said well judge why don't you try it and let us know and so I'll 
just be the one to tell you that soda does in fact expire and so 
after having that terrible experience, we went ahead and pulled 
out all of the soda that had expired and put in fresh soda. So 
I wouldn't expect you to have a bad experience, but if for some 
reason we missed something, let us know again. 
During the course of the trial it is important that you be 
able to hear everything that is said and be able to see 
everything that is shown. If you have difficulty hearing or 
seeing, please let us know. Don't wait until the end of the 
trial and when you're leaving say oh by the way it would have 
been nice. I couldn't really hear very much. Just raise your 
hand and get our attention and we'll make the adjustments that 
need to be made for your benefit. 
Thank you. All right Mr. Young, Mr. Arnold, one last time 
at the bench to confirm this list please. 
[Discussion at bench.] 
THE COURT: Just double-check my marks to make sure. So 
I've got Juror 1, 4, 8, 9, 14, 16, 17 and 21. Does that look 
right? Okay. All right, thank you. 
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All right ladies and gentlemen, I'm now going to read the 
names of those of you who have been selected to serve as the 
Jury in this case. 
Mr. Arnold is this the jury 
selected? 
MR. ARNOLD: It is Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Young is the jury selected? 
MR. YOUNG: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Ladies and gentlemen if 
you were not selected, you are now free to leave. You're 
excused with the thanks of the Court. I truly appreciate your 
patience this morning. I wish you well. You will receive a 
check in the mail for your time. You're not going to get rich. 
I'll just tell you that now. It might be enough just to cover a 
couple of ice creams, but it's the State's way of thanking you 
for your time and as I think Ms. Rogers told you before I 
started the process, by coming today, by being selected to come 
you're off the hook for two years which is probably the best 
news that I could give you today. 
So thank you. Have a wonderful day and a wonderful 24th 
holiday coming up and appreciate your time. 
BAILIFF: All jurors that were selected if you'll just 
come with me. 
[The Bailiff seats the Jury.] 
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BAILIFF: So we have 
and 
THE COURT: All right ladies and gentlemen, now that 
you're comfortable in your seats, I'm going to ask you to stand, 
raise your right hand and my Clerk is going to swear you in as 
the Jury that's been selected in this case. 
THE JURY PANEL IS SWORN. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. You may be seated. Now 
as I indicated to you, I'm going to let you take a short break 
to use the restroom, make phone calls, get a drink, whatever you 
need to do and then when you come back in I will read you the 
initial set of jury instructions, invite the attorneys to make 
their opening statements and begin presenting evidence and then 
we'll just kind of see where we are time wise. 
Now that I've got you there, do you have any thoughts 
about how you would like me to handle the lunch, whether you 
would like a shorter lunch or a longer lunch? Nobody has a 







to set up. 
ARNOLD: Could we see how far we get? 
COURT: Okay. 
ARNOLD: Is that okay? 
COURT: That's fine. You bet. 
ARNOLD: Just during the break we've got a few things 
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THE COURT: Okay. All right, then we'll be in recess for 
let's say--what do you think? Ten minutes is adequate? 
MR. ARNOLD: At least ten. 
MR. YOUNG: Go 15 just to be safe. 
MR. ARNOLD: Let's go 15. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll be in recess for 15 minutes. 
That should be plenty of time for you to get oriented in the 
back and then we'll reconvene and proceed as I've outlined. Any 
questions that you have of a general nature? Okay, thank you. 
BAILIFF: Okay, just a reminder. On that back row, watch 
that step. We did have one juror take a tumble off of there. 
[Jurors leave the Courtroom.] 
THE COURT: All right. The record will reflect we're 
outside of the presence of the jury. Anything that we need to 
discuss at this time? 
MR. YOUNG: Possibly. I'd like to make a record at least 
of what took place with Juror Number 5. 
THE COURT: All right, you go ahead. 
MR. YOUNG: Just to the possible jury tainting issue with 
what happened with Number 5. Officer was actually 
involved in controlled buys with my client before. He testified 
at a grand jury on issues where she set up controlled buys when 
she was a Weber-Morgan Strike Force Agent. She made comments to 
that end here today that she knew my client due to her 
involvement with the Weber-Morgan Strike Force department, when 
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she was working with them. She made reference knowing my client 
in that capacity in front of all the jurors. 
So I mean there's a possible issue. You know, I was 
looking not at her, but other jurors' faces as she was making 
the comments and there were a couple of jurors that kind of you 
know piped up when they were listening to what she was saying 
and so you know there might be some issues with 404(b) evidence 
where my client doesn't testify about prior bad acts corning in 
and she's now told them about her prior involvement. She didn't 
go into detail like I am now, but she made reference to the fact 
that she knew my client due to her involvement in the Strike 
Force work in the past. 
THE COURT: Mr. Arnold? 
MR. ARNOLD: Your Honor, I mean we knew that Ms. 
was a law enforcement officer and what was absolutely surprising 
was the fact that she knew and responded to the question of 
knowing Mr. Courtney. I think that what the Court has done by 
excusing her based on another reason, I think that we're safe to 
proceed at this point. 
THE COURT: Let me make a record. Counsel approached. We 
discussed prior to Ms. answering the question that 
pertained to whether or not she could afford the defendant his 
presumption of innocence or whether she would assume that simply 
because he had been charged that he was guilty of the offense 
and she raised her hand. Before allowing her to respond the 
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Court invited counsel to the bench. We discussed the 
difficulties that were created by 's unanticipated 
answer to the question that we always ask; which is do any of 
you jurors know either of the attorneys or any of the witnesses 
and we always include of course the defendant, not anticipating 
would go into detail about how she knew Mr. 
Courtney, but rather just that she did. I think again to make 
the record clear, she indicated that she knew Mr. Courtney and 
was familiar with him from other cases and then I think as you 
correctly noted Mr. Young, I think she did specify from her work 
with--! don't know the words she used exactly, but her 
association for sure with the Weber-Morgan Narcotic Strike 
Force. 
There was no follow-up done. The Court did not inquire 
into any of the specifics. Allowed the questioning to proceed 
with the other jurors. No follow-up was conducted from counsel 
at that time or any other time with and in an 
effort to try to avoid drawing additional attention to her 
earlier response, when the Court perceived that further 
responses by her could certainly have the potential of tainting 
the Jury, the Court made the determination to excuse her because 
her husband who is a private probation officer working for Utah 
Alternative Programs and is assigned to my Court essentially has 
contact with the Court on a weekly basis and for that reason 
excused not drawing any additional attention to her 
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association with the Strike Force or any connection to Mr. 
Courtney. 
7/15/2013 
I think there was discussion about questioning the 
remaining members of the Jury to determine to what extent, if 
any, that jury panel was influenced by her responses and I 
think, and if I'm wrong about this you correct me, but I think 
the decision was rather than draw more attention to that, we 
would allow the dust to settle and simply move on and excuse her 
and so that was a decision made by counsel and of course with 
the Court's approval as well. 
Anything that you want to clarify about what I've said? 
MR. YOUNG: The only issue is also that that's when it 
kind of came to the forefront was when the Court asked can 
anybody here not afford him the right of innocence until proven 
guilty. That's when she popped back up and we kind of quashed. 
So I mean she's the only person that raised her hand to that 
question. It kind of drew attention to her again and the Court 
did the best the Court could to quash the issue when it arose, 
but I mean up to that point there's possible bias already and 
maybe tainting of the jury pool at that time. 
THE COURT: Well maybe I just need to ask Mr. Young and 
maybe we need to recess and give you some time to think about 
it, but I sort of broached the subject with counsel at the 
bench. Are you asking the Court to--well, we have a couple of 
problems. 
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MR. ARNOLD: The Jury has been sworn. 
THE COURT: They have, but I think--and you correct me if 
I'm wrong because I've not had this issue. In a jury trial is 
it when the jury is sworn or is it when the first witness takes 
the stand? 
MR. YOUNG: When the jury is sworn. 
MR. ARNOLD: When the jury is sworn. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, so the problem that I have is I 
invited a challenge to going forward. I said are you making the 
claim that the jury has been tainted and we should not have a 
trial and that motion was never brought or even alluded to at 
the bench. 
MR. YOUNG: Well I said I needed to make--I thought I said 
up there pretty clearly that I need to make a record of this at 
some point, but there was never a break again between the Jury 
being selected. I didn't know at what point to make that. The 
Jury was in the room the whole time, but I did allude to the 
fact up there I needed to make a record of this, make a--at 
least put on the record my objection to it. I thought I made 
that pretty clear up at the bench. 
MR. ARNOLD: The issue--I have to go back and read my 
Fifth Amendment stuff, but I think that once the Jury is sworn, 
I mean all bets are off for the State. 
THE COURT: Jeopardy attaches. 
MR. YOUNG: Yes. 
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MR. ARNOLD: Jeopardy attaches. All bets are off for the 
State. We've got to move forward with where we're going and 
however the case may be or may result, but I mean there was 
some--! thought that from the conversation that we had that the 
dust had settled as the Court had indicated and so I don't think 
that the objection at this point is timely, if it is an 
objection. 
THE COURT: And I think that's my concern is that I don't 
feel like there was ever a formal--! mean there was reference 
made to making a record, but never a formal indication that a 
motion to declare a mistrial and re-set the trial was ever made. 
I mean I think Mr. Young expressed concerns as did the Court, 
but I don't think the Court was advised that there was going to 
be a motion for mistrial. 
MR. YOUNG: That's correct. I didn't make that motion. 
THE COURT: And I want to make that clear because I think 
it does affect the procedure and the way I handled it because 
had I anticipated that, I would have entertained that motion 
prior to swearing the Jury in of course to avoid the jeopardy 
issues and because I didn't perceive that that motion was going 
to be brought, I went ahead and swore the Jury in and then 
allowed us to just make this record for the sake of making a 
record. 
MR. YOUNG: But see? I haven't had a chance to talk to my 
client about his concerns about it either. I mean we just kept 
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rolling so I thought--and I missed the Court swearing the Jury. 
I was re-organizing and shifting sides and wasn't paying 
attention when you were swearing the Jury in. So I actually 
want for the jeopardy to attach, but I wasn't paying attention 
as I was going on. I was trying to re-arrange and my client was 
asking me a question and so I didn't catch the issue, but I had 
every intention of bringing it to the record because he leaned 
over and made some comments to me. I didn't want to draw more 
attention from the Jury panel as we were selecting them about 
what was taking place, but he does have a concern about the jury 
pool being tainted based on Juror Number S's comments. 
THE COURT: Well I don't quibble with Mr. Courtney's 
concerns. I think the issue is that it was discussed at the 
bench Mr. Courtney. I asked the attorneys if they wanted to 
conduct follow-up to ferret out whether or not there was that 
taint and the response that I received is no. We don't want to 
further the problem. We don't want to make it worse than 
perhaps it already is. 
So we're just going to leave it alone because she made one 
comment and it was quite some time ago, kind of early on in the 
voir dire. I mean at the very beginning of the voir dire when 
the jury was asked do you know Mr. Young or Mr. Courtney and I'm 
just going to find at this point in time that there has not a 
motion been made. There wasn't one made at the time she made 
the response. There could have been one made at that juncture. 
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The minute the response was made we could have excused the 
panel and you could have made that motion right at that moment 
or we could have had discussion about ferreting out the 
poisoning effect, if any, that the rest of the jurors 
experienced from her response. That was not done and even as 
late as right before the jury was selected there was no motion 
made and so I'm just going to find that at this point the motion 
is untimely. 
I think the concerns have been expressed and placed on the 
record. I respect them. made one comment and was 
not allowed to answer the second question when she stood up. I 
stopped her from responding and then that was when we excused 
her. So we have the one response on the record. I think you've 
indicated what that was and so we're going to move forward. 
I mean to the extent that you are making a motion for 
mistrial, and I don't know that you are, because you haven't, 
but I mean are you making that motion? 
MR. YOUNG: Well I haven't had a chance to discuss that 
with my client. I'd like to--I mean I guess during this recess 
I can discuss that with my client. I haven't had a chance to 
discuss it. 
THE COURT: Okay. You talk to your client about it and 
let me know. Anything else? 
MR. ARNOLD: I don't have anything currently. I think Mr. 
Young, nothing that we can't handle, but we may just need a few 
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extra minutes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Understood. Thank you. 
[RECESS.] 
[Discussion at the bench.] 
7/15/2013 
THE COURT: I'm not trying to make more of this than needs 
to be made, but I have a couple of concerns that I'd like to 
just kind of flush-out and express the first of which is this. 
I think, and I understand how we get on a roll and we things 
just keep going and going and going and it's difficult to kind 
of call a time out and say I need to go talk to my client. I 
mean I understand logistically how that can be awkward. 
The flip side is as I'm looking back over this selection 
process I'm thinking there were plenty of chances we had to try 
to cure it or fix it before we swore the Jury in. I mean and as 
I reflect on some of the things we could have done, well one of 
them would have been right at that moment to either make the 
motion or approach and make the motion or start calling the 
jurors back individually so as to not have them answering in 
front of everybody and asking them you know is there anything 
about wha said that you feel is going to influence 
you? We didn't do that, okay? It is what it is. I'm not being 
critical. I'm just saying we were all trying to figure out how 
to solve it and we were struggling. 
So now we're in a posture where you haven't made a motion. 
You may make the motion. I don't know if you will or won't, 
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but the likelihood that I'm going to grant it is very slim 
mostly because of untimeliness. So great for you, right? I 
mean in the sense that you don't have to worry about jeopardy 
attaching and him walking, but the bigger problem that I have is 
we always have looming out there ineffective assistance of 
counsel, always, and despite attorneys' best efforts, their 
performance is called into question. 
Here we have what I perceive as a pretty significant 
situation. Maybe you disagree. I don't know what appellate 
counsel would say about Mr. Young's performance with respect to 
this issue and whether he should have done something and didn't. 
MR. ARNOLD: We spoke about that and I think we talked 
that this is probably, at this point, it's untimely. So 
ineffective assistance would be the claim that would be made up 
on appeal. I think that Mr. Young had a reasonable trial 
strategy for not, you know, I guess at the time raising more of 
a raucous. So--
MR. YOUNG: I didn't know where I was supposed to make the 
timely--I thought it was after the jury was picked I was 
supposed to make my [inaudible] Ineffective obviously. I mean 
I brought it to the Court's attention I thought up here where I 
thought I made it pretty clear that I needed to make that a 
record. I thought we were making a record up here. 
THE COURT: Well my issue is I just don't want to try this 
again in a year or two years because they send it back on an 
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ineffective assistance. 
MR. ARNOLD: Well that's probable now. 
THE COURT: I mean that's my concern. I'm just being as 
frank as I can be. I just don't want it coming back. 
MR. ARNOLD: I agree. No, I think that there's--
THE COURT: And I don't know how to cure it at this point 
and maybe we can't and I don't know whether or not there was any 
wiggle room in negotiating. That's still the potential to be 
explored. I mean the problem was created through no fault of 
ours. I mean it was created by a juror who quite honestly, in 
my opinion, ought to be bitch-slapped because--
MR. YOUNG: She knew better. 
MR. ARNOLD: Yeah. 
THE COURT: --I mean for her not to understand the 
tainting that she was creating when she said that, it's hard for 
me to--
MR. YOUNG: If I had known she was Strike Force I would 
have said something earlier. You knew she was Strike--
MR. ARNOLD: I had heard. I haven't dealt with that. 
THE COURT: But the problem is you still didn't know 
whether she knew him or not. I mean none of us knew that--
MR. ARNOLD: No. I had no idea. 
THE COURT: --and the question was a yes or no question. 
MR. YOUNG: No one anticipated it. 
THE COURT: It was not--
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MR. ARNOLD: Does anybody know--
THE COURT: --how do you know. It was just do you know. 
So are we on or off? Okay. I just wanted to make sure. Yeah, 
that's fine. 
COURT CLERK: [inaudible] 
MR. ARNOLD: Yeah. So, I mean as far as the [inaudible] 
I'm not coming off of seconds. He wants thirds. He has earned 
seconds and so I gave him an offer in which we would dismiss 
certain cases of his. The offer is still--I mean I'll leave 
that open currently. If he wants to take the offer, then that's 
fine. 
THE COURT: I'm just so frustrated with--
MR. YOUNG: [inaudible] 
MR. ARNOLD: [inaudible] 
MR. YOUNG: Well the thing is he thought there was a 
video. We told [inaudible] that we were looking for a video on 
it. We found there's no video. Audio is pretty--I mean you 
can't tell whether he was in the room or not which can be 
Vanderwarf's testimony. Vanderwarf got killed in the papers in 







YOUNG: It doesn't matter. It's public opinion. 
ARNOLD: Well I mean here's the--you want to listen 
listen to the tape. 
YOUNG: I've heard the tape. I've heard the tape. 
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THE COURT: Okay. Well it is what it is. I was just 
trying to avoid appeal issues down the road. 
MR. YOUNG: I'm sure there's going to be an appeal. 
THE COURT: It's like I said. That juror should be 
slapped for--I mean that's an extreme statement, but it just 
reflects the frustration of the Court that she would go beyond 
the simple question of do you know and offer what she offered. 
It's so frustrating to me. 
MR. ARNOLD: Then the other option that we have I think is 
for him to waive--I don't know. This is just thinking outside 
the box--for him to waive any double jeopardy concerns that 
could come back on another day. 
MR. YOUNG: I don't think we can waive double jeopardy. 
Can we do it? 
THE COURT: I don't know. 
MR. ARNOLD: I can call over to the office and see what 
the chiefs think. 
THE COURT: Well it's your guys' case to try. So you do 
what you want to do as far as how we go forward. If you want to 
just call the Jury back in and get going, that's what we'll do. 
I mean I've got the instructions. I'm ready to go. I just 
wasn't sure if you had thought through the appellate issues that 
are created by it. 
MR. ARNOLD: [inaudible] Talk to him about that or just 
go forward? 
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THE COURT: I mean does he want to come back and re-try 
this in a year? I can't imagine he wants to do that any more 
than the rest of us. 
MR. YOUNG: He thinks he's going to win. 
THE COURT: But let's assume he doesn't. 
MR. YOUNG: I've had this conversation with him. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
MR. YOUNG: He can appeal. 
THE COURT: Okay, but my point is let's assume he wins his 
appeal. He's back here re-trying this case in a year. Does he 
want to do that? I mean do you have--okay. Okay. I'm not 
trying to elicit--
MR. YOUNG: He's got six felony cases pending. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I understand. 
MR. YOUNG: He's going to be in prison that whole time, 
five six times [inaudible] 
MR. ARNOLD: [inaudible] 
THE COURT: Okay. Well I guess he'll have to appeal then. 
Do you want to make the motion then before? 
MR. YOUNG: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
Okay, before we bring the Jury in, Mr. Young let me turn 
the record over to you. Do you have any motions you wish to 
make? 
MR. YOUNG: Yes. I'd like to make a motion for a mistrial 
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due to the tainting of the jury due to Juror Number S's comments 
[inaudible] 
THE COURT: Mr. Arnold a response? 
MR. ARNOLD: I believe that the objection is untimely now 
that the Jury has been sworn. 
THE COURT: I think the Court is going to find in this 
particular case that this disclosure that we're talking about 
occurred early on in the jury selection process. Specifically, 
it was shortly after each juror indicated their name, residence, 
married or single, children, education, occupation, I 
introduced--the attorneys introduced themselves and their 
witnesses and it was in response to the question do you know Mr. 
Young or Mr. Courtney, his client, that Juror Number 5 responded 
that she did through her experience with law enforcement, 
specifically with the Narcotics Strike Force because of other 
case involving Mr. Courtney. 
Now she did not specify Mr. Courtney's role in those other 
cases. Did not indicate whether or not he was a victim in other 
cases, whether he was an informant in other cases. She never 
specified exactly how Mr. Courtney was involved in those other 
cases and so to that extent I think the statement was generic, 
innocuous, non-specific. She wasn't allowed to elaborate beyond 
that. There was no motion made at that time, no motion made 
during any of the rest of jury selection and when Juror Number 5 
prepared to answer the question of whether or not she would be 
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able to afford the defendant his presumption of innocence until 
the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt its case, she raised 
her hand and was going to respond to that question. Was not 
allowed to and was then excused because her husband is a private 
probation officer who is assigned to this Court and that was the 
reason she was excused in an effort to not draw any further 
attention to her earlier response. 
There was discussion at the bench again about how to fix 
the problem. There was no request to individually question each 
of the remaining jurors to determine whether there was taint. 
The decision that was made was to not draw any further attention 
to Juror Number S's earlier response and to proceed with the 
selection process. 
After the attorneys were asked if the jury selected was in 
fact the jury that they had intended to select and each 
responded in the affirmative, and even during the moment in time 
when the remaining members of the jury panel were excused and we 
were seating the eight that were selected, no motions were made. 
Attorneys did not ask to approach the bench to discuss the need 
to make a motion and so the jury was subsequently placed under 
oath to serve in this case. 
Based on the numerous opportunities that existed to bring 
this motion previously, I'm going to find that the motion is 
untimely and I'm going to deny the motion for mistrial in this 
case. 
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